When Mitt Romney first started
running for president in 2008, the major reason he offered that we should vote
for him was his acumen as a business man who knew how to lead us out of our economic
doldrums, and the primary piece of evidence he offered in support of that
reason was his career as founder and CEO of Bain Capital.
What
can’t be argued is that, under Romney’s leadership, Bain Capital became one of
the most successful private-equity firms in this country, a multi-billion
dollar entity that provided almost uninterrupted generous dividends to its
shareholders. What can also not be
argued is that a number of the companies Bain invested in, Staples the example
most cited, grew into highly successful businesses at least partly as a result
of the capital Bain provided and the management it exerted.
What
also can’t be argued is that at least as many companies became little more than
short-term cash cows for Bain and either slid ultimately into bankruptcy or
emerged from Bain’s tether as a significantly reduced version of their former
selves.
In
Romney’s speeches, he talks loudly about the number of jobs Staples and Bain’s
other success stories created subsequent to the Bain takeover and styles
himself a job creator on the basis of those jobs. He doesn’t talk much about the companies that Bain forced to
shed jobs, or send them overseas, and he talks not at all about those that
eventually collapsed, taking not just some but all of their jobs with them.
Just
taken at face value, what Romney seems to be suggesting is that, as head of
Bain, he should be given credit for any jobs companies it invested in created,
but should be absolved of responsibility for jobs destroyed in other companies
it invested in. Kind of a “have my
cake and eat it too” thing.
There
are a couple of things worth considering here. First, private equity companies like Bain generally target
two kinds of companies: those that are relatively small and young and appear to
have a business model that could be successful, or those that have reached a
point where they are established businesses but find themselves strapped for
capital.
If
you look at the companies Bain took over, all of the success stories—especially
as success relates to company growth and job creation—fall into the first
category. They were, like Staples,
relatively young and small and growing.
To be sure, not all young and small and growing companies that Bain took
over grew like Staples, but all of the Bain takeovers that did grow fall into
this category.
On
the other side of the coin, you find companies like Dade International, GS
Industries or American Pad and Paper, all of which had successful established
businesses but lacked the funds to protect themselves from a Bain takeover. In each of those cases, and many more
like them, Bain closed facilities and fired workers to create the illusion of a
better bottom line. At the same
time, the Bain management team put huge loans on the companies’ books, part of which was used to boost the
company’s cash reserves and further create the illusion of profitability, and
part of which was to pay very sizeable “management” fees to Bain. In the end, many of the companies
simply went bankrupt, largely because of the debt burden forced on them by
Bain, and the ones that didn’t, Bain sold at a profit. In either case, Bain and its shareholders
made significant money, while the companies emerged either non-existent or
markedly smaller than before Bain took over.
What’s
important here, and needs to be placed in counterpoise to Romney’s campaign
claims, is that the business model he created for Bain had no direct relation
to the creation of jobs, but a very direct relation to their elimination. Bain didn’t change Staples’ business
model when it made its investment.
It was, to be sure, the infusion of Bain cash that allowed that business
model to flourish, grow and create jobs, but the job creation was the result of
a Staples business model that was the right idea at the right time.
With
Dade International, on the other hand, Bain took over a company that was
established, settled and generating sufficient profit to remain healthy. In a very short period of time,
Bain—not Dade International-- ordered the elimination of nearly 1,700
jobs. With GS Industries, Bain—not
GS Industries—ordered the merger of several steel plants and the subsequent
elimination of 700 jobs.
The
second point, and the one that becomes relevant to the much discussed flap
about when Romney left Bain, is that Romney founded the company and until 2002
was listed as the firm’s “sole stockholder, chairman of the board, chief
executive officer, and president.”
That
is relevant because it means that the Bain Capital business model-- what kind
of investments it would seek, how it would make and finance those investments,
what fees it would charge for its management services and what degree of
management control it would exert over companies it invested in—was created by
Romney.
He
served as its very much controlling head until at least 1999, so the “Romney
way”—to coin a phrase—was very much ingrained in Bain Capital when he
left. Nothing that Bain has done
since then departs in any significant way from the modus operandi it followed
while Romney was actively in charge. The business model, in other words, didn’t change
because the founder left.
It
was the period between 1999 and 2002 when the most egregious job-killing
effects of Bain investments were felt.
It was during that period that Bain essentially took the lead in
encouraging—even requiring in some cases—companies to send jobs off-shore or
simply reduce employment by eliminating jobs.
Romney claims he should bear no
responsibility for that because he was no longer in charge but that’s a little
like George Bush claiming no responsibility for the 2009 recession because he
was no longer president.
What
Romney created was a company designed to maximize profit for his partners and
their investors by doing whatever would maximize the value of their
investments. When that meant
eliminating jobs, jobs were eliminated.
When that meant loading otherwise healthy companies with unsustainable
debt, debt was undertaken.
I
confess to not understanding what difference it makes whether Romney actually
left in 1999 or not until 2002.
The company he created behaved during those years exactly as it had
behaved in the 15 years prior to 1999 and there is certainly nothing to suggest
that, had the olympics not come along, Romney would have made any changes in
that behavior.
Nor
is there anything to suggest that anything in Romney’s soul has changed. It’s considered a low blow to call
Romney a Gordon Gecko capitalist, but it’s difficult to examine his years at
Bain and find very many things he did that Gordon wouldn’t have done—or didn’t
do that Gordon would have done.
It’s
almost impossible to put real numbers on how many jobs Bain investments helped
create as opposed to how many they directly killed. Charitably, we could perhaps call it a wash; less
charitably, and probably more accurately, Bain’s net impact on jobs was
probably negative.
Either
way, what’s important to note is that while Romney can take credit for having a
direct hand in eliminating thousands of jobs, he can at best claim indirect
credit for any jobs created. And
while he may indeed have had no direct influence on Bain Capital decisions
between 1999 and 2002, those decisions were very clearly in keeping with the
business model—and business philosophy—he created for the firm.